The objective of this paper is to analyze the effect of privatization on the performance of firms by using a panel data set of 38 companies that were privatized in Europe. We compare the profit, profitability, total product, operating efficiency, net income, employment, leverage and risk of these SOEs before and after their privatization. The legal environment, regulation, goals of privatization and competition characterize each sector, which is why we split the total sample into sectors. Our results indicate that the performance of companies in the utility industry is significantly better after privatization; however, we cannot assert this for the other sectors.
INTRODUCTION
Billions of dollars worth of assets have been transferred from the public to the private sector in European countries (OECD, 2003) . The reasons for privatization can be categorised as economic, financial and political (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988) . Economic aims try to improve the efficiency of privatised firms by exposing them to the rigours of the capital markets. Financial reasons are based on the positive effects of privatization on public finances, especially public deficit, because the State obtains an important income from the sale of these enterprises. Finally, political reasons are based on the distributional effects of privatization on society because it allows an increase in the number of stockholders and facilitates the access of citizens to capital markets.
The objective of this paper is to focus on the economic reasons that explain privatizations. Agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and public choice theory (Buchanan, 1979) explain the differences in operating performance between private and state-owned enterprises. Previous empirical research concludes that SOEs (State-Owned Enterprises) significantly improve their performance after privatization (Megginson et al., 1994; Tian, 2001; Boardman et al., 2002; Omran, 2004) . However, now is the moment to carry out a sober assessment of the results looking at the longer-term evidence.
In this paper, we analyze whether there are differences between the pre-and postprivatization performance of privatised firms in Europe, as well as between industrial sectors. We carry out a comparative study of firms privatised in European countries after 1999 to investigate the differences in their financial and operating performance and to prove whether privatization leads to better operating performance. The empirical work consists of analysing whether there are differences between the profit, profitability, total product, operating efficiency, net income, employment, leverage and risk of SOEs before and after their privatization.
This paper adds new evidence about the privatization process in Europe. Previous research refers to a group of privatised firms or to a specific European country. By contrast, this paper provides an analysis of the effects of the privatization process on firm performance for all Europe. Furthermore, it analyzes the differences between privatised firms by classifying them into sectors, which allows comparisons between companies of similar characteristics.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review the theory and previous literature. Section 3 details the research methodology and data employed. Section 4 presents the empirical results and, finally, Section 5 contains the conclusions.
PREVIOUS LITERATURE AND THEORY
Agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and public choice theory (Buchanan, 1979) explain the differences between the performance of private firms and SOEs as a result of the differences in the principal-agent relationship and because State officials pursue their own, non-social welfare-maximising objectives.
The main empirical study concluding that SOEs significantly improve their efficiency after privatization is that of Megginson et al. (1994) , which analyzes the financial and operating performance of companies from 18 countries that carried out full or partial privatizations through public share offerings during the period 1961 to 1990. The authors found improvements in operating efficiency after privatization which were related to the increase of sales and capital investment spending and the decrease of debt levels. Another study that finds positive effects from privatization is that of Dewenter and Malatesta (2001) , who carry out a cross-sectional and longitudinal analysis of 500 firms in 1975, 1985 and 1995 . The comparison between SOEs and private companies shows that the former are significantly less profitable than privately-owned firms and use more leverage than private firms do. In Canada, Boardman et al. (2002) find that privatization significantly improved the operating and financial performance of companies. The same result is found by Omran (2004) who evaluates the financial and operating performance of recently privatised Egyptian SOEs, and Tian (2001) who finds that Chinese firms without state shareholding perform significantly better than SOEs.
Factors that have a positive influence on privatised companies are competition and regulation. On occasions, privatization may also expose the firm to the discipline of product market competition and market pressures, which can lead to improvements in the performance of the firm (D'Souza et al., 2000; Bozec and Dia, 2007; Bachiller, 2009) . The existence of competitive markets, which control the managers of privatised firms, is an essential requirement to improve performance (Kole and Mulherin, 1997) . Vickers and Yarrows (1991) conclude that efficiency increases because of competitive forces in mixed markets where public and private firms interact. Likewise, Hodges (1997) considers that privatization without increasing market competition produces ambiguous welfare results as public monopolies are replaced by private monopolies with a minimum of competition.
Regulation is a key factor that exerts control on privatised companies because most of these firms are established in a market with a net infrastructure which is necessary to regulate (OECD, 2000) . Ramamurti (2000) asserts that governments could use regulation to correct the market failures derived from a monopolistic situation. Moreover, it is necessary to redefine regulatory policy to improve the privatization of SOEs. Parker (1998) asserts that an optimal regulatory system encourages management to manage business assets efficiently.
Privatised companies often experience structural and cultural changes that affect their operations (Cuervo and Villalonga, 2000; Hamilton, 2006; Cabeza and Gómez, 2007; Arcas and Bachiller, 2010) . Zahra et al. (2000) present a model that links privatization to a firm's organisational transformation which proves that a company increases its entrepreneurial activities and innovation when it changes from state to private ownership. To compete successfully in a competitive market, privatised companies must learn to use new technologies, managerial skills and financial resources to improve their performance. Some research indicates that these changes take place before privatization: SOEs are restructured to be more profitable before being sold to private companies. This has been found in France (Berne and Pogorel, 2004) , Hungary (Iwasaki et al. 2010) and Spain (Vergés, 2000) . In the UK, Boussofiane et al. (1997) carry out a study of privatised organisations to compare the level of efficiency between public and private ownership applying the DEA technique. The authors conclude that the improvement in efficiency took place two or three years before privatization, so it was not related to the change in ownership.
Notwithstanding, the literature reveals some doubts about an automatic link between privatization and improvements in efficiency or economic welfare (Kole and Mulherin, 1997; Villalonga, 2000; Pejovich, 2005) . As Alexandre and Charreaux (2004) , assert contextual, organisational, governance and strategic variables positively influence privatization results. Indeed, efficiency is not solely a matter of ownership, but social and commercial variables also intervene (Letza et al., 2004) . Villalonga (2000) analyzes the influence of political and organisational factors on the efficiency of Spanish SOEs. The author tests whether privatization increases the efficiency of the firms, whether the observed effect of privatization on efficiency is influenced by political and organisational factors and to what extent the observed behaviour depends on the period considered. The results show that privatization did not always lead to increases in efficiency but varied according to the period studied and is influenced by political and organisational factors.
As can be seen, the empirical literature documents differences in performance between state-owned and private firms and the effect of privatization on the performance of privatised companies. Some of them conclude that private firms are more efficient than privatised companies and that SOEs significantly improve their efficiency after privatization. However, there is a considerable body of literature that provides conflicting evidence about improvements in the performance of privatised firms. The evidence is not conclusive and, therefore, our research question is to determine whether privatization has really increased performance in Europe.
METHODOLOGY AND DATA
We compare the operating and financial characteristics of recently privatised firms by carrying out the Wilcoxon two-sample paired signed ranks test (Wilcoxon, 1945) . We use a non-parametric test because it does not require data normality. This test is a nonparametric test that compares two paired groups. It calculates the difference between each set of pairs and analyzes them. The Wilcoxon signed ranks test is designed to test a hypothesis about the median location of a population distribution. It often involves the use of matched pairs, for example, before and after data, in which case it tests for a median difference of zero. The Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test does not require the assumption that the population is normally distributed. In many applications, this test is used in place of the one sample t-test when the normality assumption is questionable. It is a more powerful alternative to the sign test, but does assume that the population probability distribution is symmetric. This test can also be applied when the observations in a sample of data are ranks, that is, ordinal data rather than direct measurements (Appendix 1).
Following Megginson et al. (1994) , the factors we compare are profit, profitability, total product, operating efficiency, net income, employment, leverage and risk. Table 1 shows the variables used for each characteristic. 
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The literature asserts that SOEs obtain less profit and are often unprofitable because they have objectives such as maximizing employment and developing regions (Boycko et al. 1996) . Therefore, to evaluate the change in profit, we use the Profit/Loss (P/L) in the period. Profitability is measured using return on sales (ROS), return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). As SOEs usually operate in non-competitive markets, the sales of these companies are highly regulated. Therefore, we also analyse another interesting variable: total product, measured with the sales of the year. It is supposed that SOEs produce at inefficient levels to maximise employment; thus, the ratios of sales to employees and of P/L to employees are calculated to measure operating efficiency. We also analyze the variation of the number of employees to corroborate this assertion. To study the core business of the company, we analyse the EBIT (Earnings before interest and taxes), which indicates the net income of the firm. This is a measure of earnings performance of firms that is not clouded by changes in debt or taxes. Non-competitive privatised companies experience higher leverage levels than competitive companies. The lack of discipline of capital markets leads privatised companies to get into debt; therefore, we analyze the leverage of companies. There are several measures of leverage in the literature (Bevan and Danbolt, 2002) . We use the ratio of total debt to total assets. Finally, and in line with this variable, we introduce the variable Paid interest to EBIT to evaluate the financial risk of the company. When a company is privatised, the State no longer takes responsibility for the company and the financial risk increases.
First, we carry out the Wilcoxon test. We calculate the average of each variable for each firm over the three years prior to privatization (pre-privatization) and form matched pairs with the average of the three years after privatization (post-privatization). Second, we carry out the t-test, which gives the probability of the difference between the two means. Because of the differences between sectors whit respect to the privatization process, regulation, competitiveness, infrastructure, etc., we carry out these tests on the total sample and on each of the following sectors: petroleum, manufacturing, utilities, telecommunications and transport 1 . The list of privatised firms in Europe has been obtained from www.privatizationbarometer.net. The financial data was taken from Amadeus Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing. Because of insufficient data, we selected the companies privatised from 1999 onward. The sample comprises of 38 privatised firms.
Having selected the privatised firms, we take a three-year average prior to privatization to calculate the pre-privatization performance and a three-year average for the period after privatization to calculate the post-privatization performance. Table 2 presents the distribution of the companies in the sample by industry and country. It can be seen that the number of German and Spanish firms is greater than those from the other countries studied. Moreover, the manufacturing and utility sectors predominate in the sample. Table 3 provides the mean before and after privatization of the variables used in the study. The average profit of the total sample is greater in the period prior to privatization than afterwards. The profitability results coincide in the three ratios used. We must remember that the ROE ratio is not a good measure of financial performance because it is biased by the capital structure. In our sample, firms are more profitable before privatization and they sell more after the change in ownership. The measures of efficiency are conflicting. The ratio of sales to employees shows an increase in the efficiency of the companies after privatization. On the other hand, the ratio of profit to employees indicates less efficiency in the period after privatization. Contrary to previous studies (Boycko et al., 1996; Frydman et al., 1999) , privatization leads to, on average, a greater number of employees in the companies. If we analyze EBIT, leverage and financial risk jointly, we can see that the effect of leverage is more significant that the variance of EBIT in the privatised companies, since the risk ratio shows a decrease when the company is in private hands.
RESULTS
Wilcoxon signed ranks test
We examine the differences in the profit, profitability, total product, operating efficiency, net income, employment, leverage and risk using the Wilcoxon test as we explained in Section 3. Table 4 shows the differences between the performance of privatised firms before and after their change of ownership. A positive rank indicates that the variable has a higher value after privatization. For example, the profit ratio is higher in the post-privatization period in 22 firms of the sample and lower in 16 companies in the same period. In this case, the differences are not significant; we cannot assert that privatization results in a higher profit for the privatised companies. As regards profitability, the return on sales, assets and equity, are not significant because the number of companies in which the value of these ratios is higher after privatization is very similar to the number of firms in which the opposite occurs. Contrary to previous literature, once companies are privatised, their profit (and profitability) does not increase. This indicates that the mere change of ownership is not the only factor that positively affects profit. Other factors such as competition, regulation and organisational changes can have an influence on privatised companies. The results about efficiency are contradictory and depend on the ratio used. The firms are statistically more efficient according to the ratio of sales to employees, but there are no differences in the other ratio. The human resources policy is one of the most important management policies (Letza et al., 2004) and this result can be explained by labour-force adjustment plans made by privatised companies to increase the company's efficiency. There are no significant changes in the companies for the EBIT, labour ratio and leverage. As for leverage, on the hand, there is empirical evidence that profitable companies prefer to finance themselves with internal funds rather than debt and, as a consequence, will be less leveraged (Rajan & Zingales, 1995) . On the other hand, privatised companies have started internationalisation plans and they have larger funding needs. Therefore, our results find companies with higher postprivatization leverage than pre-privatization leverage, and vice versa. Finally, financial risk is higher before privatization. This may be due to state companies being more leveraged because the government takes responsibility for their debts (Rajan and Zingales, 1995) . 6 4 6 6 9 9 6 7 3 6 6 * Statistically significant at the 10% level. ** Statistically significant at the 5% level. *** Statistically significant at the 1% level.
The results of the total sample coincide with those of Villalonga (1999) , who asserts that privatization has not always led to increases in efficiency and is influenced by political and organisational factors, Boussofiane et al. (1997) , who conclude that the improvement in the efficiency of privatised firms does not take place after the change in ownership but two or three years before the privatization, and Martin and Parker (1995) , whose results do not support the hypothesis that private ownership is more efficient than public ownership.
Because the privatization process has not been homogeneous across the industries analyzed, we divide the sample into the telecommunications, transport, utilities, petroleum and manufacturing sectors. In the telecommunications sector, we find that profitability, measured by ROA, is significantly greater in firms after privatization. Contrary to the results of the total sample, sales decrease after the change of ownership and the ratio of profit or loss to employees is significant, that is, the firms are more efficient in the post-privatization period. Telecommunications have served as a flagship sale of public utilities assets and the sale of these companies produced some of the largest share offerings. Our results confirm that, in this sector, companies have become internationalised and made labour force adjustment plans. The petroleum sector has similar characteristics to the transport sector in that there are no differences in any of the ratios, so we cannot say that privatization leads to an improvement in the performance of these companies. Markets have not been really opened in these sectors. Therefore, we cannot find improvements in performance and it will be necessary to promote more competitive markets. The manufacturing sector only shows a significant improvement in the total product and the sales to employees ratio after privatization. In this sector, companies were mainly privatised by private sale and integrated into holding groups, which explains the increase of the total product and the improvement in the employees ratio. Finally, in the utilities sector, the differences are significant in almost all the ratios. The performance of the companies in this sector is significantly better after privatization. Privatised firms are more profitable because the State indirectly subsidised SOEs to maximize employment and to develop regions (Boycko et al., 1993) . However, with market competition, privatised firms will use resources more efficiently and the change from non-economic objectives to economic objectives will lead to an increase in operating efficiency. It is expected that corporate governance, better incentives and entrepreneurial initiative will increase output, as it happens in the utilities sample (Zahra et al., 2000) . Contrary to the theory that says that SOEs have high debt ratios and low default risk, our results show that utilities have more financial risk after privatization. Entrepreneurial activities foster innovation that needs investment to introduce new processes, technology and capability (Coven and Miles, 1999) . This is why privatised firms get into debt and have more financial risk.
Our results coincide with those of Dewenter and Malatesta (2001) where, at international level, it is observed that SOEs are less efficient than private firms. In the same way, Megginson et al. (1994) and Boardman et al. (2002) conclude that privatised firms improve their operating efficiency after being privatised.
T-test analysis
This section presents the results of the t-test, as specified in Section 3. As can be seen in Table 5 , the results for the total sample show a significant coefficient for the sales and efficiency variables, as occurs with the Wilcoxon test. The other variables are not statistically significant, which confirms that, for the total sample, the performance of privatised firms does not improve with respect to SOEs. The idea that private ownership leads to greater efficiency is not confirmed in the European companies analyzed. One explanation is that market regulation has not been carried out adequately to achieve more efficiency. Regulation must resolve market failures and lead to market liberalisation, so privatised companies must become more efficient in order to be more competitive.
. Humaines, Vol. 18 [2012] , No. 1, Art. 1 If we divide the sample into sectors, we can observe differences between them. In the telecommunications sector, only the coefficients of return on assets (ROA) and return on sales (ROS) are significant and show that the average of ROA and ROS before privatization is higher than the average after privatization. According to Bishop and Kay (1988) , privatised firms are more profitable, but our results show that the causality runs from profitability to privatization. Martin and Parker (1995) assert that improvements in profitability in these firms might be attributable to the business cycle rather than to any change in ownership. So, it is not surprising to find that ROS and ROA do not improve after the changes in the firm's ownership status. In the transport sector, the results of the Wilcoxon test are repeated; our variables are not significant, so we cannot say that there are differences in performance in these firms. We observe a negative and significant coefficient in ROA and ROS in the utility sector, that is, unlike the telecommunications sector, profitability is greater in firms after privatization. This is similar to the conclusion of Eckel et al. (1997) who assert that privatization erodes the profitability of rival firms, which benefits the profitability of the privatised firm studied. La Porta and López de Silanes (1999) and González Páramo and Hernández de Cos (2005) find evidence of increases in the profitability of firms following privatization. In the utility and the manufacturing sectors, efficiency is significantly greater after privatization. Omran (2004) and Tian (2001) conclude that the impact of the State on firms is detrimental and that the efficiency of newly-privatised firms increases with privatization. In the petroleum sector, profit is higher after privatization and leverage decreases. This is supported by the pecking order theory, which suggests that firms prefer to use internal equity than external funds. These differences are due to different characteristics in the process of privatization in each sector
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The two empirical methods that we have employed coincide in their results,which adds more robustness to the study.
CONCLUSIONS
We have analyzed whether there are any differences between the pre-and postprivatization performance of privatised firms in Europe, as well as between industrial sectors. We have investigated whether there are differences between the profit, profitability, total product, operating efficiency, net income, employment, leverage and risk in SOEs before and after their privatization. Our results are original and contradictory to previous studies that assert that privatization leads to an improvement in the performance of companies (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988; Megginson et al. 1994; Dewenter and Malatesta, 2001) . One reason may be that the behaviour of privatised companies must be subject to market competition. Our results contribute to the academic debate because company performance does not improve. Although markets have been opened, we cannot say that competition is effective in Europe. When markets are imperfect, more competition and a suitable regulation are necessary. For the total sample, in general, we have not found evidence that privatization leads to an improvement in the performance of the firms. Contrary to previous studies (Megginson et al., 1994; D'Souza and Megginson, 1999; Tian, 2001; Boardman et al., 2002) , our results show that privatised firms are not less operating-efficient than firms with private ownership. Nevertheless, the results are different across industrial sectors because the privatization process is different in each sector. In our empirical work, the results show that the performance of utilities is significantly better after privatization. However, we cannot assert this for other sectors. As Laffont and Tirole (1993) state, theory alone is unlikely to be conclusive in privatization studies. Consequently, the efficiency gains allowed by privatizations must be assessed through a case by case analysis. This is consistent with our study: the gains depend on the sector and on the performance of the former public management. Differences between sectors may be for several reasons. Firstly, because of the different regulation and legal environment in each industry. Secondly, the goals of privatization vary between industries. Finally, market strengths have not been incorporated in the same way in all the sectors, which implies that there are different degrees of competition. These findings indicate the need for a better understanding of causes that lead to these differences between industrial sectors.
The results obtained in our empirical research suggest that a change of ownership per se is not sufficient to bring about the expected effects. One reason may be that privatised companies were restructured before changing ownership (Vergés, 2000; Iwasaki et al. 2010) . We can assert that the improvement of efficiency is an ongoing process which requires the introduction of competition into the markets because the efficiency of companies that operate in monopolies is determined by the degree of competition and regulation. Therefore, the question is not the public versus private ownership dichotomy, but rather the economic conditions under which the services are delivered.
The novelty of this work vis-à-vis other studies is that we find no evidence of improvement in the performance of privatised companies. On occasions, the improvement in efficiency might not fully materialise until some years after privatization. This occurs if a restructuring process is necessary, especially in larger SOEs which may have benefited from state support.
,..., 1 ;    Assumptions -The differences i Z are assumed to be independent. -Each i Z comes from the same continuous population, and is symmetric about a common median  . -Find the critical value for the given sample size n and the confidence level. For samples of a small size the critical value is obtained from a table (which is calculated by considering all possible distributions of ranks to calculate p , the statistical probability of attaining S from a population of scores that is symmetrically distributed around the central point) As the number of scores used, n , increases, the distribution of all possible ranks S tends towards the normal distribution. So although for 20  n , exact probabilities would usually be calculated, for 20  n , the normal approximation is used. The recommended cutoff varies from textbook to textbook -here we use 20 although some put it lower (10) or higher (25).
-Compare S to the critical value, and reject 0 H if S is less than or is equal to the critical value. 
